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Abstract
Natural disasters are among the main causes of large-scale failure scenarios. The dynamic behaviour of natural disasters and their
probabilistic failure pattern indicates a need for a dynamic probabilistic protection approach to address the issue and reduce the
number of disrupted connections in the network. Appropriate data protection against a time-varying destructive phenomenon serves
to prevent damage before it occurs. In this case, the endangered route should be detected and the data passing through should be
rerouted through more reliable paths prior to failure. The high-risk paths can be detected based on the decision parameters in the
dynamic preventive approach. In this article, we develop a new method to improve the assignment procedure of decision factors in
preventive protection models using network topological properties and links failure probability. The proposed decision parameters
are adaptive with the network conditions and updateable while the disaster spreads through the region. The adaptive characteristic
of the rerouting decision parameter will enhance network eﬃciency and facilitate network management.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki.
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1. Introduction
Integral dependence of modern life to the Internet reveals the undeniable importance of having reliable communication
of information. The current technology, allows us to transfer a substantial amount of information (up to 100 Gb/s).
Any damage to the network, intentional (e.g., cyber-attack) or unintentional (e.g., natural disasters), will inevitably be
very costly to businesses and subscribers. Network data protection in cases of single- or double-link failures has been
studied extensively in the past; however, data protection against several simultaneous failures is the main concern in
large-scale failure scenarios. For this case, there is an insuﬃcient amount of time for the aﬀected network to recover
the damaged components such as links or nodes and, as a result, a considerable amount of information will be in
danger.
Natural disasters have a high destructive power to damage several network components at the same time in a
vast geographical area. In the event of a natural disaster such as an earthquake, critical infrastructures like energy
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grids, water supply facilities, telecommunication systems and the Internet may face serious damages. In this case,
data protection in a communication network gains particular importance. A closer look reveals that the destruction
produced by a natural disaster expands dynamically, and over time the destructive energy gradually decreases to zero.
The damage caused by natural disasters can therefore be depicted through a probabilistic failure model, which is more
realistic compared to deterministic failure approaches.
Modern technologies make it possible to estimate the probability of a natural disaster occurring in a speciﬁc area.
However, they are not capable of identifying the exact location, severity of the disaster and the possible size of the
vulnerable area. This feature makes the pre-planned protection mechanism infeasible or very costly and suggests that
a phenomenon with a dynamic destructive behaviour requires a dynamic reaction. An appropriate reaction should be
taken after detecting the severity of the disaster, which considers network conditions and available resources in the
aﬀected region (e.g., dynamic restoration methods).
It should also be noted that the characteristic of the impacted area by the disaster has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
damage rate. For example, the rate of damage of an earthquake in a crowded city is higher than the same disaster in
an uninhabited place such as the middle of a desert. This is the motivation to improve preventive protection models 1
to consider topological network aspects and its eﬀect on data loss. The proposed model not only protects data in face
of failures but can also adapt itself dynamically with damage spreading through the region.
2. Topological network properties
The strategic importance of some nodes or links in a network can be more than other network components. A node
is important if its removal will aﬀect network eﬃciency. The importance of a node or link may increase the criticality
of the paths that are using these components. One way to study the importance of nodes or links in a network is
to evaluate their centrality with parameters such as nodal degree, betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centrality.
With the assumption that data between the source and destination takes the shortest path, our interest is to evaluate
the importance of the network components using betweenness centrality. Freeman2 discussed the importance of node
betweenness, which counts the fraction of shortest path passing a given node. For a given connected graphG = (V, E),
V is a set of nodes and E is a set of links. The node betweenness for node v ∈ V can be shown as:
bc(v) =
∑
s,d∈V,sd
ξsd(v)
ξsd
(1)
where s and d are the source and destination nodes of the ﬂow, ξsd is the total number of available shortest path
between s and d and ξsd(v) is the number of shortest paths between s and d that passing through node v.
Node betweenness is generalized to link as edge betweenness, which is the fraction of the shortest paths between
two nodes that run along that link3.Edge betweenness for a link in a path between the source s and destination d can
be illustrated by,
bc(l) =
∑
s,d∈V,sd,l∈G
ξsd(l)
ξsd
(2)
where ξsd(l) is the number of shortest paths through link l for the data ﬂow between the node s and d.
Node and link betweenness are among the parameters that are of concern to network researchers to evaluate network
performance or estimate network vulnerability. Sterbenz et al. 4 showed that selecting links and nodes with higher
betweenness in an intentional-failure scenario had more eﬀect on the network eﬃciency compared to random links
and nodes failure. The results show that failures in a few nodes with high node betweenness can reduce network
eﬃciency signiﬁcantly.
Betweenness centrality and resistance distances can be used in design and control of communication networks5.A
weighted random-walk path criticality routing algorithm may be able to select the best backup path with minimum
total cost in a shared backup protection approach. Betweenness centrality and its relationship to random walks was
discussed to develop the proposed routing algorithm.
Network vulnerability assessment is a way to identify weak points in the network for further improvement to
increase network resiliency. A metric to study network vulnerability using normalized average edge betweenness as a
vulnerable index is discussed in6. The vulnerability of several networks was studied using this metric.
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Betweenness centrality can also be employed to assess network vulnerability for random damage or malicious
attack in a complex network7.The authors introduced link-based multi-scale vulnerability with integrating power and
links betweenness for complex networks. The proposed approach was employed for link placement in a network that
produces the maximum resistance in case of malicious attack.
Node and link betweenness and other centrality are metrics used to develop a framework to analyse the robustness
of multilevel networks8. The authors discussed the impact of removing network components (nodes and links) on
network performance and ﬂow robustness.
The above articles are examples of methods that use node or link betweenness to study network eﬃciency or
assess the vulnerability of a network. In order to develop a model for large-scale failure scenarios using betweenness
centrality we discuss some recent studies and the taken approaches in data protection.
3. Data protection in large-scale failure scenarios
The importance of network reliability in large-scale failure scenarios motivated network researchers to study data
protection through diﬀerent approaches. Bassiri and Heydari9 studied path restoration in regional large-scale failure
scenarios in European communication networks. Delay time of sending failure notiﬁcation in a MPLS network
through a deterministic failure approach is discussed and the authors argue that adding a small percentage to the
network capacity can restore substantial traﬃc in failure scenarios.
In analyzing the damage levels caused by large-scale failures, the reduction of packet delivery rate (PDR) is an
important metric for evaluation of network performance degradation10. PDR is the ratio of the number of sent packets
from the source to the received packets on the destination side. The authors showed that increasing the number
of impacted network devices in a large-scale failure scenario and deterministically eliminating them signiﬁcantly
decreases PDR.
Another approach to improve network resiliency is assigning priority to data ﬂows. Prioritizing network connections
can be employed to protect valuable data in large-scale failure scenarios. In the event of a disaster, considering
available capacity in the network, restoring high priority data ﬂow and protecting important data may increase network
eﬃciency11.
Taking into account the dynamic characteristics of natural disasters, data protection prior to large-scale failure
scenarios may reduce the number of disrupted connections1. A dynamic preventive protection model is able to reroute
data from paths that are detected as endangered routes through more reliable paths. This approach should be taken to
protect data from disruption before a disaster can damage risky paths.
Considering the strategic importance of nodes and links in a communication network and their failure impact on
network eﬃciency, we can improve our previously proposed preventive approach1 to a more eﬃcient approach that
is able to adapt itself with network conditions and dynamically update the preventive rerouting strategy. To give a
better understanding of the new approach, we brieﬂy explain the preventive protection model. The main structure
of the preventive protection model is based on data protection prior to failure. For this purpose, considering the
available information about the disaster and geographical knowledge of the impacted region, each network component
is assigned a failure probability. Using this information, an end-to-end failure probability for each path is computed.
The preventive model employs two parameters to make decision on data routing prior to failure; upper risk threshold
and lower risk threshold. Paths with a failure probability more than the upper threshold are identiﬁed as endangered
ﬂows and will have to be rerouted through more reliable paths. The candidate paths to reroute endangered data
are selected based on the lower risk threshold parameter. Any path with a failure probability less than the lower
threshold is assumed to be a path in the safe zone. By using this approach, the proposed model will successfully
reduce the number of disrupted connections in the network. When the preventive model decides to protect a path, it
is possible that there will be no path available to reroute data in the safe zone. In this case, a path with a better failure
probability and not necessarily in the safe zone will be selected as the backup route. In the rerouting approach, the
main factor when making a decision regarding data protection and indicating endangered routes is the upper threshold
parameter. We enhance the proposed model in1 to improve the decision parameters in preventive routing and make
them updateable according to network conditions. The proposed approach is explained next.
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3.1. Preventive rerouting threshold
To improve the eﬃciency of preventive protection models and make them adaptable with network conditions, we
merge the upper and lower risk thresholds to one decision parameter called Preventive Rerouting Threshold (PRT).
Any path with a failure probability higher than PRT is considered to be an endangered path and its data is rerouted
through any available path with a failure probability less than PRT. If the model is unable to ﬁnd a path under PRT,
the best available path with the least failure probability is then selected to reroute the data.
By expanding the disaster through the region and determining the failed nodes and links in each inspecting interval,
we obtain an updated topological status of the network. This information is used to recompute the PRT and make the
decision parameter adaptive to network conditions. The main contributions of the adaptive model are as follow:
1) Decision parameters in preventive protection models1 have to be initialized by network operators, however
assigning value to PRT in an automated way can improve network management. PRT is computed based on the
strength of the disaster, regional characteristics and network topology properties in the impacted area. The computed
PRT based on the above knowledge is used in the protection approach.
2) PRT is updated as a disaster expands through the region and considering the network status in each interval.
Adjusting PRT in each decision interval leads to an updated PRT in tune with the needs of network protection.
3) Adapting the protection model with network conditions helps to dynamically determine high-risk paths in each
decision interval. It is possible that some routes, which are considered to be safe paths in the previous interval,
are detected as endangered paths with the updated PRT in the new interval and have to be rerouted prior to failure.
This property eliminates the need for the lower threshold to determine the safe zone. The proposed model protects
endangered paths by rerouting them through the safe zone that is dynamically determined in each decision interval.
The process to compute and assign PRT parameter in the protection model is explained next.
3.2. Adaptive preventive protection model
A disaster may aﬀect a limited geographical area, which implies that we need to improve data protection within
this area. Rerouting data through paths outside the hazard zone is an idle protection. The drawback of this solution
is that rerouting all connections out of the disaster area is costly. On the other hand, failures in large-scale scenarios
follow a probabilistic pattern and each network device has a chance to survive the disaster. In this case, there is no
need to transfer data from links with low failure probabilities with the intention of safeguarding their information. An
appropriate solution to calculate PRT is to consider failure probability and the strategic importance of links. Figure
1 shows a disaster zone and the aﬀected links and nodes. Each link in the disaster area contains a failure probability
and an edge betweenness centrality.
Fig. 1. Disaster zone and network topological properties.
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Fig. 2. (a) Updating procedure of rerouting decision parameter with disaster expansion; (b) European backbone network.
A computed end-to-end path failure probability1 in a network is greater than or equal to the minimum failure
probability of the associated links. If a link has a high failure probability, we might argue that any path using that
link is at risk. In this case, failure probability of a link in the disaster zone can be employed to assess upcoming path
failure probability. Another important factor to determine PRT is the strategic importance of a link. To evaluate this
parameter, we compute link betweenness for each link in the disaster zone. These two parameters are used to assign
a damage risk to a link for further protection action as follows:
δl = f p(l) × bc(l) (3)
Here, δl is the damage risk of link l with betweenness centrality bc(l) and failure probability fp(l). In each interval
decision, we consider the maximum and minimum calculated link damage risk and determine the associated failure
probability. The average of the determined failure probabilities is employed by the proposed model to adjust the
rerouting decision factor, PRT:
PRT = Avg( f p(max(δ)) + f p(min(δ))) (4)
Spreading devastation through a region and destruction of communication links and nodes changes network topology.
Changes in topology may alter betweenness centrality for the remaining links, which needs to be recomputed for the
post-failure topology. The new betweenness value is used to update the PRT and keep the decision parameter adaptive
with the network status. Figure 2(a) shows the procedure of calculating PRT. In the next section, we evaluate the
performance of the proposed model and present the numerical results.
4. Simulation model and results
We evaluate the eﬃciency of the proposed approach by running a simulation model in failure scenarios. The
selected network topology is the European Reference Network (ERnet) with 37 nodes, 57 links and a mean nodal
degree of 3.08. Figure 2(b) shows the ERnet network.
The topology in our study is an undirected graph. The disaster is modelled in a circular shape with a radius that
expands with time. We assumed that the failure probability of a node is the same as the attached link. We simulate the
disaster duration for 50 seconds. Any network component outside of the impacted area is considered to be safe and
operational. If a node fails, we assume that all its connected links also fail and are not involved in data transfer.
We model end-to-end unit demand for each pair of nodes to simulate traﬃc in the network. The possibility of a
disaster can be located in any part of the network. To evaluate the eﬃciency of the proposed model, we simulate the
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Fig. 3. Number of disrupted connections in large-scale failure scenarios.
disaster event in two random places, one around the east of France (latitude=47.9 N, longitude=5.3 E) and the other
in the south of Germany (latitude=48.4 N, longitude =9.6 E).
Figure 3 presents the results of adaptive protection for disaster events in these two locations. The number of
disrupted connections in the adaptive protection model for both failure scenarios is reduced signiﬁcantly compared
to the dynamic restoration approach. The fewer number of disrupted connections translates to more reliability in the
network.
Figure 4 is a comparison between ﬁxed thresholds protection (upper threshold 75%, lower threshold 50%) and the
adaptive protection model. The results indicate that the adaptive protection model improves network eﬃciency by
reducing the number of disrupted connections compared to the ﬁxed thresholds approach.
Figure 5(a) demonstrates the change in PRT in the adaptive protection approach while a disaster expands through
the region. PRT can adjust itself in combination with the network status in each decision interval time to provide
better protection.
The core concept of the preventive protection model is to reroute high-risk connections prior to failure to reduce the
number of possible failures in the future. The adaptive protection approach occurs as background rerouting and may
impose some overhead in the network. The results for preventive protection rerouting for the two disaster locations
are depicted in ﬁgure 5(b). Based on the rerouting decision parameters value and topological properties in the disaster
area, the number of preventive rerouting paths to improve network protection may be diﬀerent.
Fig. 4. Network performance with ﬁxed and adaptive threshold assignment.
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Fig. 5. (a)Threshold adjustment with disasters expansion; (b) Preventive protection rerouting.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we improved the preventive protection model and made decision rerouting parameters adaptable
with network conditions. We considered the strategic importance of the link in the network or link betweenness
centrality and failure probability for endangered links to indicate the potential damage risk to each link involved in the
impact area. Using the average failure probability of the maximum and minimum computed link damage risks, the
proposed protection model calculated and assigned the rerouting decision parameters to reroute data prior to failure.
As the disaster may change the network topology, the decision parameter has to be updated in each interval decision
according to network conditions. We plan to improve the decision rerouting parameters by considering other network
centrality metrics in future studies.
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